What Do We Learn from the Price of Crude Oil
Futures?
1. There is little evidence that the price of oil futures helps to predict future oil prices a. Futures prices are less accurate predictors of the price of oil than a simple no-change forecast at most horizons. b. Spread models are less accurate than the no change forecast. c. Forecast efficiency is rejected (even though and ). d. Futures prices are not unbiased predictors of oil prices (although the bias is small). • Large variability of futures prices about the spot price due to the presence of a convenience yield.
• Theoretical model shows that uncertainty in the supply of oil can lead for large fluctuations in the basis.
• Precautionary demand for crude oil leads to changes in the basis. 
Futures and the convenience Yield
For speculative market efficiency to hold: 1. Convenience yield needs to be constant over time
• That is "the flow of services that accrues to an owner of [the] physical commodity [oil] but not to an owner of a contract for future delivery of the commodity" does not vary with economic conditions!!
• Alquist and Kilian: uncertainty in the supply of oil results in changes in the convenience yield and undermines the predictive ability of oil futures prices.
• Alternatively: one may think about introducing uncertainty in the demand for oil. Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) show that introducing uncertainty leads to strong backwardation in equilibrium.
Futures and storage costs
For speculative market efficiency to hold: 2. Storage cost should be constant over time:
• Average storage costs may vary over time as the composition suppliers/wells changes.
• Alquist and Kilian: storage takes the form of inventories held be the US above the ground.
• Additionally: One could think about underground storage and what drives the production decision of Saudi Arabia.
Forecasting: Futures as a starting point
Alquist and Kilian find little evidence that the price of oil futures helps to predict future oil prices
Adding interest rates
• Hotelling Principle (1931) 
• Hotelling's model is derived under certainty and perfect competition.
• Uncertainty ⇒ endogenous convenience yield ⇒ Backwardation as a result from optimal decision of producers (Litzenberger & Rabinowitz, 1995) • Imperfect competition: Almoguera and Herrera (2007) find that:
-On average the oil market is better characterized by Cournot competition with a competitive fringe -Switches between non-cooperative and cooperative behavior took place with collusion resulting in 29% increase in oil prices and 12% decrease in oil production.
Alquist and Kilian find no statistical evidence that the Hotelling forecasting model is superior to the no-change forecast in MSPE and MAPE. 
